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An immense role in the collapse of the USSR was played by a whole array of factors: the public 
being tired of the Communist project; the massive shortages of consumer goods, which made 
people hate the government; the growing opposition within the Communist party to Gor-
bachev’s reforms; the hesitation of the General Secretary who tried to rely in turn either on 
the right or on the left wing; the drastic fall in the living standards. The crucial role, however, 
was played by “the parade of sovereignties” and the Centre being too late in its attempts to 
address the national question. By the autumn of 1990, the President’s close associates started 
to sense that power was slipping from Gorbachev’s hands; with the fellow countrymen staying 
remarkably indifferent, the Soviet Union was heading towards dissolution as the ambitions of 
local party leaders in the constituent republics generated and cannily magnified nationalist 
and separatist trends. Gorbachev kept up his maneuver strategy, which put him on the verge 
of resignation in the spring of 1991 when his support was minimal. He seemed, though, to 
have managed to pull out of this dive thanks to the Soviet Union referendum held on March 
17, in which the voters were asked if they considered the preservation of the USSR necessary. 
Eventually, however, the issue of preserving or not preserving a unified state depended di-
rectly on the position of Russia as the backbone of the Soviet Union. The study draws on the 
author’s personal archive of original testimonies and interviews of the political figures directly 
involved in the events in question.
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Огромную роль в распаде СССР сыграла целая совокупность факторов: усталость об-
щества от коммунистического проекта, тотальный дефицит, вызывавший безудержное 
раздражение населения против власти, растущая оппозиция партии реформам Горба-
чева, нерешительность генсека, искавшего себе опору то в правом, то в левом лагере, 
резкое падение уровня жизни населения. Определяющую же роль сыграл «парад суве-
ренитетов» и постоянное запаздывание Центра с попытками решения национального 
вопроса. Первым крупным межнациональным конфликтом стали события в Нагорном 
Карабахе, где вспыхнули копившиеся на протяжении десятилетий противоречия меж-
ду армянами и азербайджанцами. Впоследствии национальный фактор имел определя-
ющее место во время событий в Вильнюсе и Тбилиси. Такое развитие событий было во 
многом неожиданным и для инициаторов перестройки, и для большинства советских 
граждан, поскольку в массовом сознании господствовало убеждение в том, что нацио-
нальный вопрос в целом в СССР успешно решен. Те или иные проявления националь-
ных противоречий расценивались как частные случаи. К осени 1990 г. в ближайшем 
окружении М. С. Горбачева появилось ощущение, что власть ускользает из рук прези-
дента СССР. При удивительном равнодушии общества распадался и Советский Союз: 
амбиции местных партийных лидеров порождали и искусно раздували национализм 
и сепаратистские течения. Горбачев продолжал тактику лавирования, которая подвела 
его весной 1991 г. к угрозе отставки. База поддержки союзного президента сократилась 
до минимума. В такой ситуации Горбачеву удалось, казалось бы, выйти из политиче-
ского пике — способствовали этому результаты Всесоюзного референдума 17 марта, 
на котором ставился вопрос о  существовании обновленного Советского Союза. Во-
прос сохранения или несохранения Советского Союза как государства был напрямую 
связан с позицией государствообразующей республики — Российской Федерации. Ис-
следование основано на уникальных свидетельствах непосредственных участников со-
бытий из личного архива автора.
Ключевые слова: М. С. Горбачев, СССР, национальный вопрос, дезинтеграция.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in the USSR in 1985 led to unprecedented chang-
es not only in the Soviet society, but also in the whole world. The new leader’s policy of 
perestroika brought into play the kind of dynamics that affected the very backbone of the 
immense country — the national issue.
This turn of events was expected neither by those who implemented perestroika nor 
by most Soviet citizens due to the prevalent common belief that the national question in 
the USSR had been solved fairly successfully. Whatever national tensions occurred, they 
were viewed as individual instances. All the more striking it was to everyone, including 
the top officials, that shortly after perestroika was introduced, the USSR saw the explosion 
of the “national bomb” when the republics started to express themselves politically and the 
process was unstoppable. It eventually resulted in the notorious Belovezh Accords, which 
were the bottom line of the history of the USSR. Was it predetermined? Was Gorbachev 
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leading the country the right way? Were changes necessary? Was the USSR bound to col-
lapse?1
The euphoria about the accession of a young and highly enthusiastic leader did not 
last. The long-standing problems, which had been thoroughly concealed by the Soviet ide-
ology, revealed themselves under glasnost. The ethnic issue was no exception and made 
itself evident as early as the end of 1986, during the December unrest in Alma-Ata that 
was suppressed by force. It became obvious that the more remote areas were no longer 
willing to blindly follow the command of the Centre.
The path to further and more acute ethnic strife was paved by Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which, in the words of Gorbachev, “blew up” in early 19882. Predominantly ethnic Ar-
menian (with 77 % Armenians and 21 % Azerbaijanis), the autonomous region within 
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic had long wanted to be part of Armenia, which was 
strongly objected to by the Azerbaijani authorities whose policies were aimed at keeping 
Nagorno-Karabakh separated and culturally isolated from Armenia3. In October 1987 
the Karabakh Armenians started a public and persistent campaign for reunification with 
Armenia. The authorities and the people of Azerbaijan were against the idea of losing a 
large part of their territory. Each side had its reason. The situation was heating up fast. In 
January 1988 the first few hundred Azerbaijani families left Armenia. Some of the refu-
gees settled in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait. In February, the extremists from among 
the refugees initiated a pogrom that targeted the Armenian population and left 26 Ar-
menians and 6 Azerbaijanis dead. This resulted in a mass migration of Armenians from 
Azerbaijan, and of Azerbaijanis — from Armenia4. The Centre’s response complied with 
the stance of the General Secretary: “let the Armenians and Azerbaijanis come together 
and take their own decision; we (in Moscow) will accept whatever choice they make”5; 
Gorbachev urged his Politburo colleagues to use “political methods”6. Though largely jus-
tified and logical, under the circumstances in place such an attitude led the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani political elites to believe that the central government’s position was either 
pro-Azerbaijani or pro-Armenian, respectively. Willing to act as a peace-maker, the cen-
tral government was in fact creating a deadlock by fueling, unintentionally, the escalation 
of conflict in the region. 
On 7 December 1988 a devastating earthquake in Armenia broke out. The pain of the 
Armenian nation was felt by every Soviet person. For probably the last time in the history 
1 See controversy on this issue in recent publications: Pikhoia R. G. O periodizatsii sistemnogo krizisa 
Sovetskogo Soiuza //  Rossiiskaia istoriia. 2019. No. 2. P. 3–39; Zubok  V. M. Krizis, reformy i razrushenie 
SSSR // Rossiiskaia istoriia. 2019. No. 2. P. 30–39; Zubok V. M. Nesostoiavshaiasia imperiia: Sovetskii Soiuz 
v kholodnoi voine ot Stalina do Gorbacheva. Moscow, 2011. P. 400–485; Shubin A. V. Osnovnye problemy i 
etapy istorii perestroiki // Rossiiskaia istoriia. 2019. No. 2. P. 39–51; Puchenkov A. S.: 1) Pobedy i porazheniia 
Mikhaila Gorbacheva // Rossiiskaia istoriia. 2019. No. 2. P. 205–213; 2) Zhizn’ i vremia Anatoliia Cherniaeva 
// «My nazyvali ego grafom»: Pamiati Anatoliia Sergeevicha Cherniaeva. Vospominaniia sovremennikov, 
dokumenty, publikatsii /  sost. D. A. Belanovskii. Moscow, 2019. P. 525–564; Taubman  U. Gorbachev. Ego 
zhizn’ i vremia. Moscow, 2019.
2 Gorbachev M. S. Poniat’ perestroiku… Pochemu eto vazhno seichas. Moscow, 2006. P. 151.
3 Ialyshev R. A. Problema novogo soiuznogo dogovora i ego roli v raspade SSSR: dis. … kand. ist. nauk. 
St. Petersburg, 2011. P. 41.
4 Ibid. P. 42.
5 Gorbachev M. S. Poniat’ perestroiku… P. 151.
6 Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva na Politbiuro. 3 marta 1988 g. // V Politbiuro TsK KPSS… Po zapisiam 
Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991) /  sost. A. Cherniaev, 
A. Veber, V. Medvedev. Izdanie 2-e, ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe. Moscow, 2008. P. 298.
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of the USSR the world could see that the “brotherhood of Soviet nations” was not a phan-
tom: Armenia received a colossal aid from the Centre, free of political strings7, and volun-
teers flocked from all over the world. For the last time, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov worked 
efficiently as a concerted tandem, both the General Secretary and the Prime Minister gave 
the small republic an enormous support8, travelling across the ruined Armenia in a simple 
red Ikarus bus9. Armenia was visited at the time by nearly every top official who felt pure 
human compassion at the sight of the staggering destruction in the earthquake-ridden 
towns10. What the world showed towards Armenia was the phenomenon of compassion, 
sympathy, and positive relief effort, which would have been completely impossible not too 
long before. 
As for the head of state, the writer of these lines has been told by Artashes Ge-
ghamyan, the then mayor of Yerevan, that Gorbachev was astounded that almost every 
person who saw him amidst the ruins asked not to help with the provision of housing, but 
to solve the issue of the territorial affiliation of Nagorno-Karabakh in favour of Armenia11. 
Nagorno-Karabakh set the entire Soviet Union in motion and, according to Viacheslav 
Mikhailov, head of the Inter-Ethnic Relations Department of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee, provided “a formula for putting pressure on the authorities: the local nationalists in 
the republics could see that if a rally numbered over 10 thousand people, the authorities 
hesitated to take any action”12. His words were echoed by Arkadii Volskii, Gorbachev’s 
special emissary in Nagorno-Karabakh: “In Nagorno-Karabakh we faced the first large-
scale ethnic conflict… Owing to history and the temper of the local population, a major 
war was becoming imminent…”13
The year 1988  was marked by growing ethnic tensions: in the Baltics, in Na-
gorno-Karabakh… Soon the periphery of the USSR would literally “blow up” the Soviet 
empire, and the Centre would fail to catch up on the events.
In the small hours of April 9, 1989, an unauthorized demonstration in the capital 
of Soviet Georgia was dispersed by the army resulting in 17 deaths. The parliamentary 
commission that investigated the tragedy concluded that the leaders of the Communist 
Party and the government of the republic had been fully informed about the events, and 
that the army had used chemical substances against the demonstrators14. Nearly all of 
the victims died of asphyxia (suffocation), in other words, they died in a stampede15. The 
Tbilisi tragedy, responsibility for which was assumed neither by the head of state nor by 
7 Ambartsumian S. A. Tri goda na predele liubvi i smerti. Erevan, 1991. P. 67.
8 Already in the first days, 87 thousand people were evacuated. (Dnevniki predsedatelia Soveta Minis-
trov SSSR N. I. Ryzhkova, 1985–1990 gg.) // Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii 
(RGASPI). F. 653. Op. 1. D. 553. Dnevnikovaia zapis’ N. I. Ryzhkova ot 21.12.1988. S. 2).
9 Rossiiskaia gazeta. 2018. 6 dekabria.
10 Interv’iu V. G. Zakharova, ministra kul’tury SSSR v 1986–1989 gg. (Moscow, 17.12.2017) // Arkhiv 
avtora.
11 Interv’iu A. M. Gegamiana, mera Erevana v 1989–1990 gg. (Erevan, 02.09.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
12 Interv’iu V. A. Mikhailova, v 1987–1991  gg. zaveduiushchego otdelom po mezhnatsional’nym 
otnosheniiam TsK KPSS, v 1995–2000 — ministra Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delam natsional’nostei (Moscow, 
24.01.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
13 Zavada M., Kulikov Iu. Poprobuite menia ot veka otorvat’… Dialogi s Arkadiem Vol’skim. Moscow, 
2006. P. 101.
14 Materialy deputatskoi komissii po sobytiiam v Tbilisi //  Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii (GARF). F. 9654. Op. 2. D. 65. S. 21–34.
15 Interv’iu S. B. Stankevicha, narodnogo deputata SSSR (Moscow, 01.04.2019) // Arkhiv avtora.
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anyone else16, discredited both Gorbachev and the Soviet Army and the Party leaders, and 
thus entitled Georgia to claim withdrawal from the USSR. Gorbachev and the like-minded 
officials learned their lesson from the Tbilisi “bloody Sunday”: “From now on the army 
must not be involved in such events unless mandated by the Politburo”17.
In the Soviet Union in general, things were getting progressively worse in 1989. Un-
foreseen by Gorbachev, national separatism was becoming more and more powerful and 
was making itself increasingly evident.18 “The Centre was essentially unprepared for the 
outburst of national self-identification, additionally augmented by clan, tribal, and propri-
etorial antagonisms. This was Gorbachev’s major misjudgment — the national factor was 
not taken into account. There was a belief in the existence of a ‘Soviet nation’ ”, remem-
bered Anatolii Cherniaev, Gorbachev’s adviser19. The year 1990 was not an easy one either 
for the Soviet Union or for Gorbachev. The country was falling apart. It was all at once: 
the economic turmoil, the Party unwilling to be associated with the reformer General 
Secretary, El’tsin clearly aiming at separating Russia from the Centre, and the people being 
tired of hapless reforms. Gorbachev’s team were in the wake of mainstream opinions: they 
did not approve of his hopping from “right” to “left”. By that time, Gorbachev’s associates 
had begun to realize that both the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee were losing 
their power: the periphery regions were splitting off in an uncontrollably rapid manner. 
Trying to hold the country together, Gorbachev claimed a special mandate for himself. 
Given the clear unpopularity of the Party with the public, he insisted that it was necessary 
to establish the post of President of the USSR as a figure symbolizing the Centre.
The Third Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union elected Gorbachev 
President of the USSR, yet his victory was not convincing. His refusal to run in the nation-
al election became his biggest political blunder. According to Boris El’stin’s close associate 
Gennadii Burbulis, “President Gorbachev’s legitimacy was rather vulnerable, of which all 
the later events are the evidence”20.
The main issue for the Soviet Union of 1990 was the preparation of the New Union 
Treaty. The ominous parade of sovereignties pioneered by Russia with its declaration of 
sovereignty that brought about catastrophic consequences and inspired similar declara-
tions in Uzbekistan, Moldova, the Ukraine, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and prior to those — in Georgia, Latvia, and Estonia, was 
calling for a new kind of union to hold the republics together. At the same time, gaining 
strength was another sovereignization: the autonomous republics wanted their status to 
be raised to that of union republics. In response to that, Boris El’tsin, who was elected 
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR in 1990 despite 
Gorbachev’s pressure on the people’s deputies, famously said that the peoples of the Rus-
sian SFSR could take “the share of power which they themselves could swallow”. The elec-
tion of El’tsin as chairman of the Russian parliament was “a landmark victory. Everyone 
interpreted it as a start of an open war against Gorbachev”, remembers El’tsin’s associate 
16 Ligachev E. K. Zagadka Gorbacheva. Novosibirsk, 1992. P. 224–237.
17 V Politbiuro TsK KPSS… P. 486.
18 Onikov L. A. KPSS: Anatomiia raspada. Vzgliad iznutri apparata TsK. Moscow, 1996. P. 115.
19 Cherniaev A. Gorbachev ochen’ dobryi // Moskovskii komsomolets. 1995. 11 aprelia.
20 Interv’iu G. E. Burbulisa, narodnogo deputata SSSR, v 1990–1992 — gosudarstvennogo sekretaria 
RSFSR (Moscow, 11.02.2019) // Arkhiv avtora.
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Sergey Filatov21. There developed another centre of power represented by El’tsin, which 
eventually proved fatal for the country22.
By the end of 1990, declarations of sovereignty had been adopted by all the auton-
omous republics, autonomous districts, and autonomous provinces within the Russian 
SFSR23. The struggle “for the Kremlin” between El’tsin and Gorbachev now entered a 
“hot” phase. “Russia’s hasty adoption of sovereignty was a certain point of no-return. Rus-
sia was the mainstay, the backbone of the USSR. Now the broken backbone caused a total 
collapse. A torrential sovereignization was gathering pace. Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, Be-
larus, Kazakhstan, let alone those giants — the autonomous republics — started talking 
about sovereignty”, wrote Rafik Nishanov24. He was echoed by Nikolai Ryzhkov: “I believe 
it was then, in the summer of 1990, that the foundation of the Union’s dissolution was laid. 
I have nothing against sovereignty, especially that of Russia. I believe Russia should have 
been given more rights, but the line of destruction should not have been crossed…” [italics 
added]25. According to the well-known journalist Leonid Radzikhovskii, “Russia declared 
its INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR [emphasis in original]. The Soviet Union re-
ceived a DEADLY BLOW: “the backbone was taken out of the body”26.
As it was rightfully noted by the St. Petersburg historian V. V. Kalashnikov, “the strug-
gle for power between the two leaders resulted in a battle of laws and sovereignties and in 
many ways facilitated the dissolution of both the USSR and of Russia”27. Still, does it really 
come down to El’tsin alone? “The Soviet Union was being ripped to pieces by everyone, 
not just by El’tsin. The First Secretary in each republic wanted full authority. Nobody 
thought about the consequences, and nobody wanted to be accountable to Gorbachev”, 
remembered M. N. Tolstoi, a people’s deputy of the Russian SFSR28.
The country was falling apart, yet, to the credit of the President of the USSR, Gor-
bachev worked tirelessly towards keeping it united up until his resignation. The “parade of 
sovereignties” was pioneered by Lithuania, which declared itself an independent state on 
March 11, 1990, and proclaimed the constitution of the USSR invalid on its territory. The 
Third Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union, which elected Gorbachev 
President of the USSR, announced it an illegitimate action for Lithuania to take, and called 
the Act of Independence illegal29. In the following months the “Baltic model” served as in-
spiration to other republics of the USSR, and was to this or other extent copied by them30.
21 Interv’iu S. A. Filatova, narodnogo deputata RSFSR, sekretaria Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta 
RSFSR, v 1993–1996 gg. (Moscow, 22.03.2019) // Arkhiv avtora.
22 Interv’iu V. I. Alksnisa, narodnogo deputata SSSR (Poselok g. t. Tuchkovo, Moskovskaia obl., 
02.04.2019) // Arkhiv avtora.
23 Kalashnikov V. Demontazh SSSR: vzgliad chetvert’ veka spustia // Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti. 
2016. 12 avgusta.
24 Derev’ia zeleneiut do metelei: Rafik Nishanov rasskazyvaet Marine Zavade i Iuriiu Kulikovu. 
Moscow, 2012. P. 322–323.
25 Zapisi besed N. I. Ryzhkova s sotrudnikami Guverovskogo instituta voiny, revoliutsii i mira. (SShA). 
1992–1994. // RGASPI. F. 653. Op. 1. D. 519. S. 176.
26 Radzikhovskii L. Luchshe men’she da luchshe // Rossiiskaia gazeta. 2010. 15 iiunia.
27 Kalashnikov V. Pravo — iskusstvo dobra i spravedlivosti // Pravda. 1992. 18 noiabria.
28 Interv’iu M. N. Tolstogo, narodnogo deputata RSFSR (St. Petersburg, 25.10.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
29 Kalashnikov V. Demontazh SSSR: vzgliad chetvert’ veka spustia…
30 Interv’iu G. S. Ostroumova, rukovoditelia sekretariata Prezidenta SSSR (Moscow, 06.02.2018) 
// Arkhiv avtora.
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According to Anatolii Cherniaev, “Gorbachev sincerely believed that the Lithuanians 
were not interested in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He did not realize that they 
were prepared to pull in their belts and to make any sacrifices in order to assert their 
independence. This underestimation of the national instinct — irrational, of course, but 
overriding (which can be seen not only in the post-Soviet space) — played its role”31. It is 
noteworthy that in the opinion of the USA the Baltics had a special status: the USA always 
stated that the Baltics were incorporated into the Soviet Union illegally and thus never 
recognized them as legitimate constituent republics32.
By the autumn of 1990, the President’s close associates started to sense that power 
was slipping from Gorbachev’s hands; with the fellow countrymen staying remarkably in-
different, the Soviet Union was heading towards dissolutions; the ambitions of local party 
leaders generated and cannily magnified nationalist and separatist trends.
The Centre was too late with the solution to the national issue, which was fatal to the 
Soviet Union33, and because of the “nationalist landslide” the ground was literally slipping 
away underneath Gorbachev’s feet34. Under these circumstances, Gorbachev and his team 
were assiduously developing the draft of the New Union Treaty. By then, “some of the 
republics had already declared their intention to withdraw from the USSR… Gorbachev 
had to urge and persuade them: do not go! It will make things worse for you! But, despite 
his status as President, his arguments were ignored”, remembered Anatolii Cherniaev35.
The year 1990 was drawing to a close — the year that was wasted for the country on 
the brink of the precipice. It was in that year that the process of the USSR’s dissolution 
became irreversible. “By 1991 the whole structure of perestroika was sliding apart, like 
the ski-clad feet do off the ski-track”,36 — it was obvious that the Soviet Union could be 
saved only by emergency measures. How, when, and who would take them — that was the 
problem. The President’s associates were aware that Gorbachev was losing power; accord-
ing to Alexander Bessmertnykh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Gorbachev 
“was slightly panicking, the ground was getting too hot under his feet”37. Gorbachev faced 
a difficult decision; the very course of events and the associates who appeared loyal at the 
time — V. I. Boldin, V. A. Kriuchkov, O. D. Baklanov, D. T. Yazov — were virtually pushing 
him towards Stalin’s pattern. He had a feeling that “the public failed to assimilate so many 
changes”, while the democratic flank was not able to assess the situation appropriately in 
terms of statesmanship. That was why Gorbachev decided to rely on the “right wing” part 
of his team, who were persuading him to demonstrate “a strong hand”38. The President’s 
“new course” was met extremely negatively by the democratic wing of Gorbachev’s team. 
Still in 1990, when he saw the growing gap between the republics and the Centre and 
was apprehensive that the “Lithuanian scenario” might repeat itself, Gorbachev declared 
that it was necessary to sign a New Union Treaty. The draft was being prepared during 
31 Cherniaev A. Gorbachev ochen’ dobryi…
32 Interv’iu A. A. Bessmertnykh, v ianvare  — avguste 1991  g.  — ministra inostrannykh del SSSR, 
chlena TsK KPSS (Moscow, 21.03.2019) // Arkhiv avtora.
33 Gorbachev M. S. V meniaiushchemsia mire. Moscow, 2018. P. 199.
34 Grachev A. S. Gibel’ sovetskogo “Titanika”: Sudovoi zhurnal. Moscow, 2015. P. 194.
35 Cherniaev A. S. Shest’ let s Gorbachevym. Moscow, 1993. P. 364.
36 Interv’iu A. S. Gracheva, v 1991 godu — chlena TsK KPSS, v avguste — dekabre 1991 g. — press-
sekretaria Prezidenta SSSR M. S. Gorbacheva (Moscow, 05.07.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
37 Interv’iu A. A. Bessmertnykh…
38 Interv’iu A. S. Gracheva…
Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2020. Т. 65. Вып. 3 833
the unrests in the Baltics and the South Caucasus, but what increased the risk of dissolu-
tion tenfold was the situation in Russia: Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
SFSR Boris El’tsin, who hated Gorbachev, considered the President of the USSR, i. e. the 
Centre, the only obstacle to absolute power. In reality, what made the actual signing of the 
Treaty impossible in 1990 was the position of Russia (i. e. El’tsin’s) blocking Gorbachev’s 
initiative. The further fragmentation of the country and a drastic reduction in his power 
encouraged Gorbachev to swing to the right, towards the adherents to strong arm tactics 
in keeping the republics, the Baltics in particular, within the USSR, but the January 1991 
events in Vilnius not only discredited the head of state before the democratically-minded 
public and the global community, but also left Gorbachev himself shocked as he interpret-
ed the January 13 bloodshed as a manufactured incident aimed against him as President39.
The democratically-minded public felt that the Vilnius events posed a threat to the 
reforms; the tanks in the streets of Vilnius were seen as a warning of a forthcoming dic-
tatorship and as a rehearsal of a possible coup in Moscow. The credibility of the central 
government and of Gorbachev personally was now eroded, while the local national “lead-
ers” became immensely popular since they were viewed as the only hope to protect the 
republics from the punitive actions by the Centre. However, Gorbachev was in fact trying 
to find an acceptable method to preserve the country intact and to keep the situation un-
der control. Politically, the events in Vilnius were his defeat: the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize 
winner was no longer admired by the Russian democratic community, whereas the Presi-
dent, in his turn, stated his willingness to use strong arm tactics in order to defend the laws 
of the Union but was not able to take the responsibility for it — as a result, the security 
officials felt “betrayed” and blamed him for being passive and dysfunctional. Gorbachev’s 
associates, for their part, strongly believe to this day that he did not order the military 
forces to take action in Vilnius40.
Gorbachev kept up his maneuver strategy, which put him on the verge of resignation 
in the spring of 1991 when his support was minimal. He seemed, though, to have managed 
to pull out of this dive thanks to the referendum on the future of the Soviet Union held on 
March 17, in which the voters were asked if they considered the preservation of the USSR 
necessary. Gorbachev went all-in: if the voters had answered the question negatively, he 
would have had to resign. He spoke about being prepared to leave his post in that case in 
the presence of his adviser Anatolii Cherniaev41.
On March 17, 1991, a Soviet Union referendum took place for the first time in his-
tory. 76,4 % of the voters answered “yes” to the question put to them — “do you consider 
necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federa-
tion of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an individual of any 
ethnicity will be fully guaranteed?”42. The referendum itself and the wording of the ques-
tion had a number of failings; suffice it to say that the referendum was boycotted by six 
out of fifteen constituent republics (the Baltics, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) because 
they did not see any future for themselves within the renewed Union. The referendum 
39 Gorbachev M. S. V meniaiushchemsia mire. P. 202.
40 Interv’iu V. N. Ignatenko, press-sekretaria Prezidenta SSSR M. S. Gorbacheva v 1990–1991  gg. 
(Moscow, 17.10.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
41 Cherniaev A. S. Dnevnikovaia zapis’ ot 23  iiulia 1991  g. //  Cherniaev A. S. Sovmestnyi iskhod. 
Dnevnik dvukh epokh. 1972–1991 gody. Moscow, 2009. P. 965.
42 Protokol Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii referenduma SSSR // GARF. F. 7522. Op. 13. D. 134. S. 6.
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took place in the situation where the authorities virtually acknowledged that preserving 
the USSR as a union of 15 republics was not possible.
The referendum was undoubtedly a timely and powerful step taken by Gorbachev43; 
and he was elated by the results44 which showed that the majority of the Soviet people 
did want to preserve the country intact45. The president’s position was now stronger. “I 
suppose that had it not been for the referendum, there would have been no Novo-Ogary-
ovo sessions, which helped to diffuse the tension for some time and to create the condi-
tions to overcome the crisis”, Gorbachev reasonably states46. Thanks to the outcome of the 
referendum, there began a months-long Novo-Ogaryovo process47, in which Gorbachev 
demonstrated an exceptional art of political maneuvering and achieved a serious number 
of halfway tactical victories.
On April 23, 1991, a day before the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee, Gorbachev succeeded in holding a meeting with the leaders of nine republics and in 
persuading them to recognize the New Union Treaty as a first priority. The result was the 
adoption of the famous “9+1” Agreement: the nine republics and the Centre represented 
by the President began to develop the text of the new treaty. The situation being difficult 
for Gorbachev, the republics found it would be in their own interest to support the Presi-
dent in order to avoid an unpredictable response from the security officials48.
The “9+1” Agreement gained a resonance among the public and gave certain hopes 
that the situation in the country would soon become stable49. The outcome of the March 
referendum provided a political and legal ground for signing the New Union Treaty. Yet, 
the first sessions of the Novo-Ogaryovo process revealed that El’tsin was not going to let 
this happen before the Russian SFSR presidential election scheduled for June 1250; there 
was a strong mutual mistrust between the two leaders51. El’tsin’s associates were aware that 
his confrontation with Gorbachev was not over yet and “that ‘9+1’ was a mere truce”52. 
In fairness it must be said that it was in the final months preceding the August Coup that 
there was a trend towards the establishment of a status quo between the two very influen-
tial politicians: “Gorbachev and I suddenly sensed”, El’tsin wrote in his memoir, “that our 
interests finally coincided; that we were satisfied with the roles we had. Gorbachev had 
his senior position, and I had my independence. It was a perfect solution for both”53. The 
position of Nursultan Nazarbayev, the wise Kazakh leader, who acted as a sort of “break-
water” in the conflicts between the republics and the Centre, also reduced the intensity 
of the situation: at their confidential meeting at Novo-Ogaryovo Gorbachev, El’tsin, and 
43 Interv’iu A. S. Dzasokhova, v 1991 — chlena Politbiuro, sekretaria TsK KPSS (Moscow, 14.11.2018) 
// Arkhiv avtora.
44 Interv’iu V. N. Ignatenko, v 1990–1991 — press-sekretaria Prezidenta SSSR (Moscow, 17.10.2018) 
// Arkhiv avtora.
45 Ialyshev R. A. Problema novogo soiuznogo dogovora i ego roli v raspade SSSR: avtoref. dis. … kand. 
ist. nauk. St. Petersburg, 2011. P. 20.
46 Gorbachev M. S. V meniaiushchemsia mire. P. 203.
47 Brown A. The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford, 1997. Р. 286.
48 Kravchuk L. M. Maemo te, shcho maemo: Spogadi і rozdumi. Kiev, 2002. P. 81.
49 Stankevich Z. A. Sovetskii Soiuz. Obryv istorii. Moscow, 2016. P. 257.
50 Kalashnikov V. Demontazh SSSR: vzgliad chetvert’ veka spustia…
51 Interv’iu A. A. Bessmertnykh…
52 Interv’iu G. V. Starovoitovoi, 22 maia 1991 g. // Karaulov A. V. Vokrug Kremlia — 2. Kniga politich-
eskikh dialogov. Moscow, 1992. P. 203.
53 El’tsin B. N. Zapiski prezidenta. Moscow, 1994. P. 54.
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Nazarbayev decided to start the process of signing the treaty as early as on August 20. An 
obvious problem was the name of the country they agreed on: the Union of Soviet Sover-
eign (not Socialist!) Republics. The name had long been debated, and the abbreviation was 
eventually settled on “for the sake of the harmony of sounds, rather than the content”54. 
That alone was worrisome for both the party elite and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
who appealed to the results of the referendum that confirmed the willingness to preserve 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Whether the Novo-Ogaryovo process was “un-
constructive” and the draft of the Treaty was “of poor quality, controversial”, as Ruslan 
Khasbulatov thinks55, or whether, as Vladimir Egorov, Gorbachev’s aide, believes, it was 
a desperate “attempt to correct the colossal blunder of 1922, with the country’s division 
being based on the national, rather than administrative principle”56, is hard to say now.
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Anatolii Luk’ianov’s standpoint 
was quite logical: according to him, the name of the country and the main points of the 
Treaty had to reflect “the outcomes of the Soviet Union referendum, in which an over-
whelming majority of the people supported the idea of preserving the USSR as a renewed 
federation of equal sovereign republics”.57 His opinion was shared by the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR. The latter, for its part, was mystified at why the President at some point ex-
cluded the supreme body of power from developing the draft of the Treaty, and why he 
did not inform the Supreme Soviet about the amendments made by the participants of 
the Novo-Ogaryovo process58. The news about it reached the ears of the President, but he 
was firm in pursuing his agenda of signing the Treaty as soon as possible, even against the 
legal odds.
The ultimate priority of the Treaty was expressed in Gorbachev’s formula: a powerful 
Union — powerful republics59. President of the USSR “was himself in charge of develop-
ing the draft”60. He invited the best experts — Z. A. Stankevich, Yu. M. Baturin, A. A. Sa-
zonov, V. N. Kudriavtsev  — who developed various versions of the draft. The group of 
experts was very limited; in accordance with the old Communist party tradition, in the 
evening, when his work of the day was done, Gorbachev in person inspected and reviewed 
what the experts had produced during the day. The development of the draft was fully 
and solely controlled by Gorbachev and his apparatus: neither the CPSU Central Com-
mittee, nor the Security Council, nor the Politburo were notified of the content of the ne-
gotiations at the presidential residence. It was deliberately arranged so: President and the 
General Secretary, embodied in one person, wished to inform his party and government 
subordinates only upon signing the treaty; this being said, Gorbachev emphasized that 
in Novo-Ogaryovo he “acted as president”, and not as General Secretary61. In those most 
54 Interv’iu Iu. M. Baturina, v 1991 godu — sotrudnik apparata Prezidenta SSSR, ekspert po podgot-
ovke novogo Soiuznogo Dogovora (Moscow, 30.06.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
55 Interv’iu R. I. Khasbulatova, v 1990–1991  gg.  — pervogo zamestitelia Predsedatelia Verkhovno-
go Soveta RSFSR, s oktiabria 1991 g. — predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR (Moscow, 12.08.2016) 
// Arkhiv avtora.
56 Interv’iu V. K. Egorova, pomoshchnika prezidenta SSSR (Moscow, 06.02.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
57 Luk’ianov A. I. V vodovorote rossiiskoi smuty (razmyshleniia, dialogi, dokumenty). Moscow, 1999. 
P. 53.
58 Atamanchuk G. V. Novoe gosudarstvo: poiski, illiuzii, vozmozhnosti. Moscow, 1996. P. 36.
59 Shakhnazarov G. Kh. S vozhdiami i bez nikh. Moscow, 2001. P. 417.
60 Neokonchennaia istoriia. Besedy Mikhaila Gorbacheva s politologom Borisom Slavinym / avtor-
sost. B. Slavin. Moscow, 2001. P. 54.
61 Falin V. M. Bez skidok na obstoiatel’stva: Politicheskie vospominaniia. Moscow, 1999. P. 413.
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complicated and arduous discussions he, according to V. V. Bakatin, “displayed superhu-
man patience”62, going back again and again to the various disputable points of the Treaty. 
The Party was barred from participating in the Novo-Ogaryovo process. The high-rank-
ing Central Committee officials heard some vague speculations about Gorbachev making 
concessions to the republics63 but they did not have a clear idea of either the course of 
the negotiations or the content of the draft approved by the leaders of the republics and 
ready to be signed64; the CPSU Central Committee were thus “outspokenly critical” of the 
Novo-Ogaryovo process65.
The situation sometimes turned into a sad joke: for example, Secretary of the CPSU 
Central Committee and member of the Politburo Alexander Dzasokhov was familiarized 
with the draft “for old friendship’s sake and privately” by the head of the president’s appa-
ratus G. I. Revenko66.
On behalf of the president’s apparatus, the work of developing the text of the Treaty 
was supervised by G. Kh. Shakhnazarov and G. I. Revenko. The progress was very slow 
and difficult: “after each Novo-Ogaryovo session something important for the Union was 
lost… The republics had the upper hand”, remembered Yu. M. Baturin who was an active 
participant in developing the draft67. In some ways, he believed, the New Union Treaty 
was similar to “divorce proceedings with a pending date”68.
What the relations between the Centre and the republics would look like, what the 
Centre’s and the President’s prerogatives would be, and which of the Centre’s rights would 
now belong to the republics, remained shrouded in mystery until the very last moment. 
While settling for, in the words of Anatolii Cherniaev, “a de facto free confederation”69, 
Gorbachev must have understood that the Treaty’s provisions were politically vulnerable, 
and that the central structures in the new union were loose, but he must have hoped to 
later give them more political substance to suit his needs70. Being a hopeless optimist, 
Gorbachev, as he himself confessed, remained too positive and confident even in 199171. 
Did his confidence have no solid foundation? To begin with, Gorbachev did not believe 
that the Union could possibly dissolve72, the very idea went against his mindset and his 
expectations, and what is more, it made no sense to him — there was, in his opinion, no 
benefit for the republics. Consequently, he was assured that the republics would not at-
tempt to withdraw from the Union.
62 Bakatin V. V. Doroga v proshedshem vremeni. Moscow, 2015. P. 322.
63 Interv’iu V. V. Kalashnikova, v iiule  — avguste 1991  g.  — sekretaria TsK KPSS (St. Petersburg, 
31.10.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
64 Interv’iu B. P. Guseletova, v 1990–1991 gg. chlena TsK KPSS (Moscow, 19.12.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
65 Nazarbaev N. Liubye pogranichnye pretenzii segodnia — eto neminuemoe krovoprolitie // Nezavi-
simaia gazeta. 1992. 6 maia.
66 Interv’iu A. S. Dzasokhova…
67 Interv’iu Iu. M. Baturina…
68 Ibid.
69 Cherniaev A. S. Dnevnikovaia zapis’ ot 3  avgusta 1991  g. //  Cherniaev A. S. Sovmestnyi iskhod. 
P. 969.
70 Interv’iu A. Ia. Degtiareva, v 1991 godu — zaveduiushchim ideologicheskim otdelom TsK KPSS 
(Moscow, 14.03.2017) // Arkhiv avtora.
71 Gorbachev M. V 1991 godu ia byl slishkom samouveren // Nezavisimaia gazeta. 1995. 29 dekabria.
72 Interv’iu Iu. M. Baturina, sotrudnika apparata Prezidenta SSSR, eksperta po podgotovke novogo 
Soiuznogo dogovora (Moscow, 30.06.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
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The Treaty was scheduled to be disclosed for signing on August 20, 1991. Its final 
version was “highly controversial in nature but provided a good chance of preserving the 
union of at least nine republics. It could have served as a foundation for either a federa-
tion or a confederation, depending on who and with what purpose would implement it”, 
writes the St Petersburg historian R. A. Yalyshev73. There are indications that if the Treaty 
had been signed, the union would have been preserved in this form or another — with 
Gorbachev or without him74. The August 15, 1991 issue of the Pravda newspaper carried 
the draft of the Treaty of Union of Sovereign States that had been approved on July 2375. “A 
lousy document, but it has to be signed even though it’s not brilliant. If it gets signed, we 
can hold on”, — such was the answer of Viacheslav Mikhailov, head of the Inter-Ethnic Re-
lations Department of the CPSU Central Committee when he was asked by O. S. Shenin, 
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of his opinion of the published draft76. The 
Union failed to “hold on” — all the agreements between the Centre and the republics were 
destroyed as a result of the August Coup, and the path to the dismantling of the USSR was 
now open.
It has been over a quarter of a century since the August Coup of 1991, which trans-
formed this country utterly, and to some extent — transformed the whole world. Many of 
the coup-related questions will probably never be answered. One thing is obvious, though: 
the coup attempt, which caused the collapse of the Union, could have been avoided. So 
believed, among others, Anatolii Cherniaev, the President’s aide. According to him, “had 
Gorbachev not taken a holiday, there would have been no coup”77. Of the same opinion 
are Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V. V. Kalashnikov and Gorbachev’s press 
secretary V. N. Ignatenko. They both emphasize that Gorbachev would have remained in 
power, had it not been for his journey to the Crimea and the subsequent coup attempt; 
they both point out that Gorbachev and his team, most of whom took their holiday at the 
same time with the boss, were all extremely tired78. Gorbachev himself admits that his 
holiday was highly untimely79. Before the holiday he gave the impression of being tired 
to death and at the same time of being satisfied: according to Alexander Bessmertnykh, 
who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Gorbachev felt that “a considerable 
work had been done, the dissolution had been suspended, and now it was time to take a 
break”80.
After his confinement in Foros, Gorbachev returned to Moscow in the early hours 
of August 22. As a sincere optimist, he was hoping that the hardest of the trials were over. 
And yet, after his unfortunate holiday he returned to a country where he had no real 
73 Ialyshev R. A. “Novoogarevskii protsess” vyrabotki novogo soiuznogo dogovora vesnoi  — letom 
1991  g.: federatsiia ili konfederatsiia? //  Mezhvuzovskaia nauchnaia konferentsiia “Rossiia v epokhu re-
voliutsii i reform: problemy istorii i istoriografii”. Sbornik dokladov. Sankt-Peterburg, 27 noiabria 2015. St. 
Petersburg, 2016. P. 279.
74 On the development of the Union Treaty see.: Lukashin A. V. Razrabotka rukovodstvom SSSR 
Soiuznogo dogovora (mart — dekabr’ 1991 goda): dis. … kand. ist. nauk. Moscow, 2012. 253 p.
75 Dogovor o Soiuze Suverennykh gosudarstv // Pravda. 1991. 15 avgusta.
76 Interv’iu V. A. Mikhailova, v 1991 godu — zaveduiushchego otdelom mezhnatsional’nykh otnoshenii 
TsK KPSS (Moscow, 24.01.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
77 Cherniaev A. Gorbachev ochen’ dobryi…
78 Interv’iu V. N. Ignatenko (Moscow, 17.10.2018) // Arkhiv avtora; Interv’iu V. V. Kalashnikova (St. 
Petersburg, 31.10.2018) // Ibid.
79 Gorbachev M. S. Ostaius’ optimistom. Moscow, 2017. P. 249.
80 Interv’iu A. A. Bessmertnykh…
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power: the Centre had virtually collapsed in the three days of the coup81. The sagacious 
V. A. Medvedev, who rushed with presidential aide Oleg Ozherelyev to the airport to meet 
Gorbachev, uttered the prophetic words: “The coup is the end of Gorbachev as President. 
The end of his career”82. As Vladimir Lukin, who was a people’s deputy of the Russian 
SFSR at the time, said, “Gorbachev came back, but power did not come with him”83.
Gorbachev had to face the new rules of the game: President of the Soviet Union was 
no longer free in his decisions and to a significant extent had to depend on El’tsin. El’tsin 
and Khasbulatov invited him to attend the extraordinary session of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet, which had begun the day before. Most probably he expected to be welcomed with 
triumph, but the reality, which the entire nation could see during the live broadcast, was 
that Gorbachev’s speech was constantly interrupted by audience members and eventually 
turned into a degrading interrogation presided by El’tsin as the main winner of the August 
events84. As Ruslan Khasbulatov put it, “it was El’tsin’s public revenge for all the humilia-
tion he had suffered… Since then Gorbachev essentially was El’tsin’s prisoner”85. 
The public lashing showed the multi-million population that President of the USSR 
had no power any more, that he was no longer “tsar”86; while Gorbachev was being “inter-
rogated” by El’tsin and the people’s deputies, the country could see that “the USSR de facto 
did not exist”, remembered V. T. Tret’iakov, editor-in-chief of a major opposition newspa-
per Nezavisimaia Gazeta87. In order to “ease the tension” El’tsin issued a decree to suspend 
the activities of the Russian Communist Party as a force involved in the coup attempt.
Having dismantled the party apparatus, El’tsin and his team could start to demolish 
the USSR. The era of Gorbachev was declining. He lost much of his confidence; the three 
days in August had demoralized him88.
Gorbachev realized that after the coup attempt the balance of power was not in his 
favour. It was now not only by El’tsin’s associates, but also by the Kremlin courtiers that 
he was not perceived as the boss of the enormous country. “Decomposition was in the 
air, Gorbachev looked shattered and defeated”, such was the impression remembered by 
Alexander Bessmertnykh89.
It took four months and three days between Gorbachev’s return from Foros and his 
resignation. Each of those days was filled with work, but everything was useless. And 
could it have been different? As Georgii Ostroumov, Director of Gorbachev’s Secretariat, 
put it: “The attempt of the coup terrified all of the constituent republics. What if the same 
thing could happen to us? The republics began to split off, the Centre lost its authority”90. 
81 See more: Puchenkov A. S. Avgustovskii putch 1991 g.: vzgliad na sobytiia iz zdaniia TsK (po poka-
zaniiam ochevidtsev) // Noveishaia istoriia Rossii. T. 9, no. 2. P. 454–484.
82 Ozherel’ev O. I. Idealy i prestupleniia. Noveishaia istoriia Rossii: dialektika sobytii. Moscow, 2016. 
P. 62.
83 Interv’iu V. P. Lukina, narodnogo deputata RSFSR (Moscow, 22.03.2019) // Arkhiv avtora.
84 Interv’iu N. I. Travkina, Geroia Sotsialisticheskogo Truda, narodnogo deputata SSSR i RSFSR 
(Moscow, 30.01.2019) // Ibid.
85 Interv’iu R. I. Khasbulatova (Moscow, 12.08.2016) // Ibid.
86 Interv’iu P. S. Filippova, narodnogo deputata RSFSR (St. Petersburg, 18.02.2019) // Ibid.
87 Interv’iu V. T. Tret’iakova (Moscow, 19.12.2018) // Ibid.
88 Kalashnikov V. Avgust 91-go v lichnom formate // Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti. 2016. 21 ok-
tiabria.
89 Interv’iu A. A. Bessmertnykh…
90 Interv’iu G. S. Ostroumova, v 1991 godu — rukovoditelia Sekretariata Prezidenta SSSR (Moscow, 
06.02.2018) // Arkhiv avtora.
Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2020. Т. 65. Вып. 3 839
Ostroumov is echoed by S. B. Stankevich, El’tsin’s adviser in 1991–1993, who is certain that 
after the coup attempt “the republics started to run away from Moscow”91.
Gorbachev knew that the only opportunity to prevent the final collapse of the coun-
try was to make a new union treaty at the earliest possible moment. This was extremely 
difficult to do: after the coup, the republics did not feel that they had any obligations to-
wards the Centre. The unique opportunity of signing the New Union Treaty between the 
not-yet-discredited Centre and the republics had been lost because of the coup plotters, 
who unintentionally killed the USSR. August 18, 1991, when Gorbachev was isolated at 
the government dacha, “Zaria”, and announced ill, became the point of no-return, the day 
of the true destruction of the Soviet Union. “After August 19 the Union disappeared in a 
day”, remembered Boris El’tsin92. According to him, the coup not only undermined the 
adoption of the Union Treaty, but also resulted in the collapse of the Centre93. Stanislav 
Shushkevich, one of the Belovezh signatories, also believed that the collapse of the USSR 
“de facto took place in August 1991 after the defeat of the GKChP”94.
The immature and ill-considered actions of the GKChP made the adoption of the 
New Union Treaty highly unlikely; after the coup the power of the USSR President was 
in many ways a phantom, the political initiative was taken by El’tsin whose agenda was 
aimed at abolishing the Centre represented by Gorbachev. Against all odds Gorbachev 
managed to resume the Novo-Ogaryovo process, but now the outcomes completely de-
pended on Russia and the Ukraine, whose leader Leonid Kravchuk was quite open and 
honest about his unwillingness to discuss the New Union Treaty in an interview to the 
Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper: “The Centre has discredited itself. They say, the Cen-
tre will not be the same, and it will be created by the republics… And who did it use to be 
created by? I think if we are to undertake anything, it must be on a different, and I want 
to stress this, on an absolutely different foundation. The Novo-Ogaryovo process is over 
because of the GKChP. The new stage of our work implies creating something similar to 
the European Community”95. In another interview, Kravchuk indicated indirectly that he 
did not see any future in continuing the Novo-Ogaryovo process directed by Gorbachev96. 
At that time, the Centre de facto was in charge only of the foreign policy issues being de-
tached from the domestic policy.
Gorbachev had to rely completely on El’tsin. The issue of preserving or not preserv-
ing a unified state depended directly on the “cornerstone component” of the union, i.e. 
Russia. It was clear that the possibility of the New Treaty was slim, but Gorbachev was 
trying to grasp at any straw in the hope to outplay El’tsin. His hope proved vain.
In November 1991 it became obvious that Russia was going to stall the Treaty as long 
as possible; it was also clear that El’tsin would not put up with any form of even a token 
supremacy of Gorbachev — the Ukraine was but an excuse for El’tsin in pursuing his ulti-
mate goal, which was to remove Gorbachev from the Kremlin. Preserving a unified state 
was for him a secondary task in comparison with celebrating a conclusive triumph over 
the Soviet President, which could only be achieved by dismantling the Union and thus 
91 Interv’iu S. B. Stankevicha…
92 El’tsin B. N. Zapiski prezidenta. Moscow, 1994. P. 54.
93 El’tsin B. Proiskhodit obval soiuznogo Tsentra // Kuranty. 1991. 31 avgusta.
94 Shushkevich S. S. Moia zhizn’, krushenie i voskreshenie SSSR. Moscow, 2012. P. 196.
95 Kravchuk L. V dogovor s Rossiei ia veriu bol’she, chem v Soiuz // Komsomol’skaia pravda. 1991. 
21 noiabria.
96 Kravchuk L. Lider dolzhen podchinit’sia vyboru naroda // Izvestiia. 1991. 27 noiabria.
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leaving Gorbachev without his post. From this perspective, the position of Kravchuk, who 
did not want to sign the New Treaty either, worked to El’tsin’s benefit. The Novo-Ogaryo-
vo process had reached stalemate, and the USSR President’s close associates started saying 
that “Gorbachev’s efforts to save the Union were fruitless convulsions”97.
The results of the Ukraine’s referendum on independence on 1 December 1991, were 
used by El’tsin and his team to announce that the Novo-Ogaryovo process hit a dead end. 
In the words of Gorbachev, “the moment with the Ukraine was used by Russia’s leaders 
to their benefit”98. There was hardly any secret scheme between El’tsin and Kravchuk; it 
is much more likely that both of them felt it necessary to coordinate their efforts aimed at 
getting rid of the Centre’s patronage. What the Ukraine and Russia did was de facto stand 
as one when they brought the autumn series of negotiations to a deadlock. The Belovezh 
Accords signed by the leaders of the three Slavic republics were the bottom line of the 
history of the USSR.
December 25, 1991 saw the end of the political career of the President of the USSR 
who announced his resignation. On that day the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the 
constituent republics “set off on their own journeys” by starting a new phase in their his-
tory. “We ourselves destroyed the Soviet Union, not somebody else. So many right words 
were said — but only later. We had to make a decision then. What we decided is now his-
tory”, remembered Gorbachev99. While Gorbachev has the historical responsibility for the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, it must be stressed that the “empire” fell apart, the same 
way as it did in 1917, in full view of the indifferent people, who, by trademark Russian 
tradition, “were speechless” having no faith in the old rulers and not having yet lost their 
faith in the new ones.
Demoralized by the betrayal of the leaders of the Slavic republics, Gorbachev failed 
to take productive measures to save the Union. Loyal to his credo, he did not go beyond 
admonishments and carried on his struggle “for preserving a unified state through politi-
cal — I want to stress the word, political — methods”; he blames the Belovezh signatories 
for the “mindless and opportunistic dissolution of the Union”100, but is not ready to take 
his part of the responsibility.
An immense role in the dissolution of the USSR was played by a whole array of fac-
tors: the public being tired of the Communist project; the massive shortages of consumer 
goods, which made people hate the government; the growing opposition within the Com-
munist party to Gorbachev’s reforms; the hesitation of the General Secretary who tried to 
rely in turn either on the right or on the left wing; the drastic fall in the living standards. 
However, the crucial role was played by “the parade of sovereignties” and the Centre being 
too late in its attempts to address the national question.
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